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“Lean not on your own understanding”: Belief that morality is
founded on divine authority and non-utilitarian moral judgments
Jared Piazza∗ Justin F. Landy†
Abstract
Recent research has shown that religious individuals are much more resistant to utilitarian modes of thinking than
their less religious counterparts, but the reason for this is not clear. We propose that a meta-ethical belief that morality
is rooted in inviolable divine commands (i.e., endorsement of Divine Command Theory) may help explain this finding.
We present a novel 20-item scale measuring a belief that morality is founded on divine authority. The scale shows
good internal reliability and convergent and discriminant validity. Study 1 found that this scale fully mediated the
relationship that various religiosity measures had with a deontological thinking style in our sample of American adults.
It also accounted for the link between religiosity and social conservative values. Furthermore, the relationship between
the scale and these outcome variables held after statistically controlling for variables related to actively open-minded
thinking and the Big Five. Study 2 replicated the results using naturalistic moral dilemmas that placed deontological
and utilitarian concerns in conflict, and showed that the results of Study 1 cannot be explained by differences in moral
foundations (e.g., concern for authority more generally) or differences in the perceived function of rules. Quite the
contrary, endorsement of the divine origins of morality fully mediated the relationship religiosity had with the so-called
“binding” foundations (i.e., Loyalty, Authority, and Sanctity). Our findings highlight the importance of meta-ethical
beliefs for understanding individual differences in moral judgment.
Keywords: moral judgment, religiosity, Divine Command Theory, utilitarianism, deontology, meta-ethics, authority,
Moral Foundations Theory, conservatism, actively open-minded thinking.
“Everything that I command you, you shall
be careful to do. You shall not add to it or take
from it.” (Deuteronomy 12:32, ESV)
“Blessed rather are those who hear the word
of God and obey it.” (Luke 11:27–28, NIV)
1 Introduction
Increasing evidence suggests that there are fundamental
differences in the moral decisions of religious and non-
religious individuals (Goodwin & Darley, 2008; Graham
& Haidt, 2010; Piazza, 2012; Piazza & Sousa, in press;
Tetlock, 2003). It is well established that religious af-
filiation in America is a strong determinant of the con-
tent of people’s moral values and attitudes, for exam-
ple, whether or not one opposes same-sex marriage, pre-
marital sex, stem-cell research, or abortion (Layman &
Carmines, 1997; Olson & Green, 2006; Pew Research
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Center, 2013; Putnam & Campbell, 2010). However, re-
cent findings suggest that it is not only the content of peo-
ple’s moral attitudes that distinguishes religious and non-
religious individuals, but also the form or nature of their
moral thinking (Piazza & Sousa, in press). In particu-
lar, recent studies suggest that religious individuals tend
to adopt a deontological (rule-based) approach to moral-
ity more so than non-religious individuals (Piazza, 2012;
Piazza & Sousa, in press; see also Tetlock, 2003).
According to utilitarian ethics, the rightness or wrong-
ness of an action is derived from its total consequences,
or the net good or bad effects it produces (Baron, 2006;
Brandt, 1992, 1998; Mill, 1861/1998; Rosen, 2003;
Singer, 1993; Sinnott-Armstrong, 2009a). Within this
framework, actions that are likely to maximize good ef-
fects, or minimize the occurrence of bad effects, are those
kinds of actions one is permitted, or obligated, to perform
(though in this framework “good” and “bad” do not nec-
essarily have to be defined strictly in terms of “welfare”
and “suffering”; see Piazza & Sousa, in press; Sinnott-
Armstrong, 2009a). By contrast, according to deontolog-
ical ethics, the rightness or wrongness of an action de-
pends on whether or not the action follows or violates
a universalizable rule or duty that everyone is obligated
to follow (Alexander & Moore, 2008; Baron & Spranca,
1997; Kant, 1785/1964; Kohlberg, 1969). Within this
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framework, actions that are consistent with a rule or duty
(e.g., to tell the truth or not to lie) are the kinds of actions
one is obligated to perform, and actions that violate rules
or duties are the kinds of actions one is forbidden to per-
form. While some forms of deontology allow for rules
to be overridden when the benefits of doing so clearly
outweigh the disutility (e.g., see Gert, 2004), strict forms
of deontology argue for an absolutist or non-negotiable
commitment to rules, or “protected” (Baron & Spranca,
1997) or “sacred” values (Tetlock, 2003), even in the face
of beneficial outcomes or utilitarian incentives (e.g., Fin-
nis, 1973).
A number of studies have uncovered a robust relation-
ship between self-reported religiosity (measured in terms
of belief, identity and practices) and the deployment of
a deontological ethic. For example, studies by Piazza
(2012) found that religious individuals are more likely
than non-religious individuals to appeal to the governing
force of a moral rule (e.g., “It is wrong to break a con-
tract”), rather than appeal to the perceived harmfulness
or negative social effects of an action, when justifying its
wrongness. Piazza and Sousa (in press) established the
relationship between religiosity and non-consequentialist
thinking more extensively. They showed that religious
individuals are reluctant to judge a range of transgressive
acts (e.g., lying, stealing, defying authorities, etc.) as per-
missible even when these acts (a) produce more good than
bad consequences, (b) prevent even greater wrongdoing
of a similar kind, or (c) cause no harm at all. In a similar
vein, Tetlock (2003) found that religious fundamentalists
often reject the notion that taboo trade-offs—where a sa-
cred value (e.g., the sanctity of human life) is set in con-
flict with a secular good (e.g., monetary gain)—should
even be contemplated, let alone undertaken (see also Gin-
ges, Atran, Medin, & Shikaki, 2007). In sum, the rela-
tionship between religiosity and a deontological ethic has
been firmly established, but the question remains: what
exactly underlies this association?
1.1 Past investigations of potential media-
tors
Past studies have looked at a number of potential vari-
ables that might help explain the association between
religiosity and rule-based morality, but none of these
variables seem to provide a satisfactory account. Pi-
azza (2012) surmised that a dogged commitment to rules
might be symptomatic of a fundamentalist, right-wing au-
thoritarian, or conservative personality type—a charac-
ter profile which has been linked to closed-mindedness,
a greater need for structure, lower levels of cognitive
complexity and need for cognition, greater pessimism
about the human condition, belief in a dangerous world,
and a desire to maintain the status quo (see Altemeyer,
1998; Duckitt, 2001; Eidelman, Crandall, Goodman,
& Blanchar, 2012; Hinze, Doster, & Joe, 1997; Jost,
Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003). However, in
Piazza’s studies, predictors of religiosity still predicted
rule-based morality even after accounting statistically
for authoritarianism-conservatism, religious fundamen-
talism, personal need for structure, and need for cogni-
tion, suggesting that other elements, beyond those related
to fundamentalism and right-wing authoritarianism, un-
derlie the relationship.
Piazza and Sousa (in press) tested whether an intuitive-
thinking style might explain the deontological mindset
of religious individuals. Research by Shenhav, Rand,
and Greene (2011) has linked belief in God to an intu-
itive thinking style (i.e., trusting one’s immediate judg-
ment on an issue, rather than reflecting or deliberating
about alternative possibilities), as measured via the Cog-
nitive Reflection Test (Federick, 2005). Other research
has linked a reflective-thinking style (the opposite of in-
tuitive thinking) to the adoption of utilitarian principles in
moral judgment (Baron, 2013; Paxton, Ungar, & Greene,
2012, but see Royzman, Landy, & Leeman, in press, for
a more nuanced result). Tying together these two lines
of research, Piazza and Sousa (in press) tested whether
possessing a more intuitive than reflective thinking style
might mediate the non-utilitarian moral judgments of re-
ligious individuals—for example, whether they would
judge “harmless” taboo violations as permissible or im-
permissible (see Haidt, Bjorklund, & Murphy, 2000).
Their results did not support this mediation hypothesis.
Theorizing by Graham and Haidt (2010) suggests that
there may be important differences in the content of reli-
gious and non-religious individuals’ “moral foundations,”
or the moral values that they tend to emphasize, and
that these differential values may explain some important
differences in moral judgment. In particular, they pro-
posed that, unlike their non-religious counterparts, reli-
gious individuals cherish virtues related to group loyalty,
respect for authority, and bodily/spiritual purity—virtues
that they argue promote group cohesion, more so than
virtues such as concern for welfare and justice, which
tend to be valued fairly equally by all people (see Gra-
ham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009). While Piazza and Sousa (in
press; Study 2) experimentally controlled for differences
in the valuing of welfare as an explanation for the rela-
tionship religiosity has with deontological thinking, no
studies to date have looked at whether moralizing content
outside the scope of welfare or justice (e.g., respect for
authority) might explain the relationship.
In the present paper, we posit that the deontological
orientation displayed by religious individuals is not the
result of individual differences in what domains of moral-
ity one emphasizes. Neither will we argue that the deon-
tological ethic of religious individuals is shaped mainly
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by dispositional forces orthogonal to their religious com-
mitments or beliefs, such as how reflective or actively
open-minded they are. Rather, we propose that the de-
ontological thinking of religious individuals is largely
driven by their unique meta-ethical beliefs. More specif-
ically, we hypothesize that religious individuals who en-
dorse a belief that morality is founded on God’s moral
authority, as opposed to originating from human reason
or intuition, are those individuals who generally eschew
the consideration of outcomes when judging the morality
of an act, focusing instead on the consistency of the act
with divinely-grounded moral principles.
1.2 Meta-ethics, Divine Command Theory,
and utilitarian moral thinking
Meta-ethics refers to a set of beliefs that people have
about the nature or properties of morality, including
beliefs about the origin or foundations of morality—
or where morality comes from (Nielsen, 1990; Smith,
1994). Past research on the meta-ethical beliefs of lay
individuals suggests that people vary in the extent to
which they perceive various moral propositions (e.g., “It
is wrong to steal”) as having an objective versus sub-
jective foundation, that is, as having a truth-value that
is either dependent or independent of human minds (see
Goodwin & Darley, 2008, Nichols, 2004; though people
tend to perceive certain classes of moral propositions as
more objective than other classes; see Goodwin & Dar-
ley, 2012). To believe that morality is objective is to con-
sider moral propositions (e.g., unjustly causing harm is
morally wrong) to be more like mathematical facts (e.g.,
2 + 2 = 4) than personal opinions (e.g., sneakers are more
comfortable than sandals) or social conventions (e.g., do
not wear pajamas to work), in that their truth value ex-
ists independent from what any person or group of per-
sons thinks, wills, agrees to, or commands—but rather is
rooted in some objective feature of the act (e.g., the need-
less causation of suffering; see also Nucci & Turiel, 1993;
Turiel, 1983).
For many religious individuals moral propositions ob-
tain their moral objectivity by virtue of their origin in di-
vine commands. Indeed, past research has found that be-
lief in God is a reliable predictor of moral objectivity (see
Goodwin & Darley, 2008, Study 3). Within philosophy,
the belief that moral propositions derive their truth value
from their alignment with divine commands is known
as Divine Command Theory (henceforth DCT; Nielsen,
1990; Sinnott-Armstrong, 2009b). Although there are
several different versions of DCT, one popular version
argues that, insofar as we can trust God’s wisdom to be
perfect and supreme, and God’s character to be perfectly
righteous and just, if God wills or commands us to do
or not to do something, it is our moral duty to do or not
to do it.1 On this account, if God commands that mur-
der is wrong (e.g., Qur’an 17:31, 33), then it is wrong
to commit murder and it is our moral duty to not com-
mit murder. Furthermore, because the truth-value of the
moral claim that killing is wrong is dependent upon the
perfect wisdom and goodness of God (“God knows what
is best”), and the fact that God issued a command forbid-
ding killing, and not upon the positive or negative effects
it produces, DCT implies that it is our moral duty not to
violate this divine command, even if doing so would pro-
duce better outcomes overall (e.g., taking a life to assuage
a person’s suffering from a terminal illness).
This feature of DCT—that divinely ordained moral
rules are to be respected and not violated, even in the
face of what appear to be positive outcomes—accords
with aspects of a strict or absolutist deontological ethic,2
which asserts that certain moral acts (e.g., murder, lying)
are absolutely wrong and strictly forbidden, and there-
fore should not be performed. These common features
between DCT and absolutist deontological ethics may
account for the resistance religious individuals have to-
wards utilitarian thinking insofar as religious individu-
als are likely to endorse a DCT view of morality. In-
deed, this seems to be the case. For many contempo-
rary religious individuals, particularly those within the
Abrahamic monotheistic (Jewish-Christian-Muslim) tra-
ditions, God is the ultimate source of moral truth (i.e.,
God has perfect moral wisdom), and it is only through
divine revelation (recorded and transmitted through holy
texts or scripture) that people come to know this truth
(Gunton, 2005; Putnam & Campbell, 2010; Wade, 2009).
Furthermore, for many religious people, divine authority
is not to be questioned, either out of respect for God’s
supreme wisdom or for fear of inciting His wrath (e.g.,
Genesis 22:5-8; Isaiah 55:8-9; Job 34:12; Qur’an 6:151;
Romans 1:18; see also Aquinas, ca. 1273/1947; Boyer,
2001; Johnson & Bering, 2006; Shariff & Rhemtulla,
2012).
Related to a belief in divine moral authority is a belief
in the inadequacy of human nature as a source of moral
knowledge or action (Sinnott-Armstrong, 2009b). Within
the Judeo-Christian religion this is referred to as the doc-
trine of “original sin” (e.g., Ephesians 2:8-9; Psalm 51:5;
1From the perspective of secular ethical theory, positing divine com-
mands as the grounds for objective morality is problematic insofar as
God’s will may be arbitrary or subject to change, and positing God’s
perfect wisdom as the basis for conforming to His will is problematic
insofar as His knowledge may be inscrutable or unknowable (Nielsen,
1990). Furthermore, if we are to verify that God’s character is perfectly
good and righteous we first need an understanding of what kinds of
acts are good or righteous to perform, and this requires some indepen-
dent criteria by which to judge an action to be good or righteous (see
Nielsen, 1990; Sinnott-Armstrong, 2009b).
2Indeed, philosopher Elizabeth Anscombe (1958) famously argued
that a rule-based or deontological approach to ethics may even depend
upon a belief in divine moral authority (though see Nielsen, 1990).
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see also Aquinas, ca. 1273/1947; Bonaiuti & La Piana,
1917). According to the doctrine of original sin, human
nature was corrupted by an initial act of disobedience to
God by Adam and Eve (humankind’s first parents; see
Genesis 3). As a result, all of humanity is ethically de-
bilitated, such that without God’s guidance a person re-
mains ignorant of what is right and wrong, and will nat-
urally choose evil (e.g., Romans 5:12-21). The doctrine
of original sin thus postulates a pessimistic view of hu-
man nature, and, by extension, a pessimistic view of hu-
man judgment. Thus, for many religious individuals, the
path to good moral judgment is following God’s perfect
moral authority (e.g., Psalm 119:66), rather than relying
on one’s own imperfect thinking about how to behave
(see esp. Isaiah 55:8-9; Proverbs 3:5).
If religious individuals are more likely than non-
religious individuals to endorse DCT, this belief may ex-
plain their unwillingness to violate moral rules in the pur-
suit of a greater good. To illustrate, consider the exam-
ple of homosexuality and same-sex marriage. Since ho-
mosexual conduct is not harmful when practiced among
consenting adults—indeed, it is often the expression of
deep love and affection—then from a utilitarian perspec-
tive it should not be deemed wrong, despite the existence
of any divine command forbidding it. From a DCT per-
spective, however, if there exists a divine command for-
bidding homosexual acts, as in the Judeo-Christian tradi-
tion (see Leviticus 18:22, 20:13; Romans 1:26-27), then
the absence of harm does not nullify the act’s wrong-
ness. Thus, an understanding of DCT endorsement goes a
long way in explaining the “gap” that exists between re-
ligious and non-religious with respect to homosexuality
and same-sex marriage. Individuals who reject DCT on
epistemic grounds are free to endorse same-sex marriage
for utilitarian reasons. In this research, we test whether
differences in meta-ethical beliefs also explain the gap
between religious and non-religious individuals in their
endorsement of utilitarian morality more generally.
1.3 Overview of studies
Here we examined the role of DCT endorsement as an
explanation for the negative link between religiosity and
utilitarian thinking within American samples. Since, to
our knowledge, no psychometric instrument is designed
to assess belief in DCT, our first aim in Study 1 was
to devise a reliable instrument that would do this. As
our second aim, we sought to show that our new instru-
ment would mediate the negative relationship that other
indices of religiosity have with utilitarian thinking, to es-
tablish DCT as the active ingredient underlying the rela-
tionship observed in past studies. Additionally, as an an-
cillary goal in Study 1, we tested whether DCT endorse-
ment would largely explain the well-established relation-
ship between religiosity and social conservatism (Lewis
& Maltby, 2000; Putnam & Campbell, 2010; Rowatt,
LaBouff, Honson, Froese, & Tsang, 2009). Many social
conservative values—for example, taking a strong oppos-
ing stance towards abortion, divorce, or premarital sex—
may be buoyed by the perception of divine commands
(codified in holy texts or scripture) supporting a particu-
lar way of life or forbidding specific social acts. Thus,
it is plausible that DCT is the primary factor sustaining
the link between religiosity and social conservatism as
well. Finally, in Study 1 we sought to show that our new
instrument predicts these moral-decision outcomes inde-
pendent of actively open-minded thinking (AOT), a trait-
level cognitive variable involving an openness towards
revising one’s beliefs or judgments in light of new or op-
posing evidence (see Haran, Ritov, &Mellers, 2013), that
has been negatively linked to religiosity (Baron, Scott,
Fincher, & Metz, 2013, Study 4). As some have argued,
a commitment to rules may be buttressed by an unwill-
ingness to revise one’s moral position on an issue despite
the utility stemming from the act (see Baron, 2011, 2013;
Paxton & Greene, 2010), thus, we included a measure of
AOT in Study 1. We also included measures of Big Five
personality to test the discriminant validity of our new
scale.
Past research has shown that utilitarian thinking may
be measured in terms of a stable cognitive style or orien-
tation, plotted along a continuum (Lombrozo, 2009; Pi-
azza, Russell, & Sousa, 2013; Piazza & Sousa, in press;
but see Tanner, Medin, & Iliev, 2007, for a different
view). On one end of the continuum are strong deonto-
logical thinkers, who tend to believe that most rules (e.g.,
telling the truth) cannot be violated for any reason. On the
other end of the continuum are strong utilitarian thinkers,
who perceive that most rules or duties should be vio-
lated when doing so produces more good than bad con-
sequences (e.g., stealing food or medicine to save a life).
“Strong utilitarian thinkers” may be further differentiated
from “weak utilitarian thinkers” in that strong utilitarians
believe that it is a moral duty to violate rules when fol-
lowing the rule would prevent a greater good, while weak
utilitarian thinkers view such rule violations are merely
permissible, though not mandatory (see Lombrozo, 2009;
Piazza & Sousa, in press; Rozyman et al., in press). Con-
sistent with previous research, in Study 1 we assessed
utilitarian thinking styles using Piazza and Sousa’s (in
press) Consequentialist Thinking Style scale, which as-
sesses subjects’ moral position across thirteen different
rule violations (e.g., deception, spreading gossip). For
each transgression, participants may rule the act to be:
(a) impermissible (deontological response), (b) permis-
sible when there are more good than bad consequences
(weak utilitarian response), or (c) obligatory when there
are more good than bad consequences (strong utilitarian
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response). Consistent with previous findings (Piazza &
Sousa, in press), we hypothesized that our measures of
religiosity would be negatively associated with a utilitar-
ian thinking style. However, extending past findings, we
predicted that our novel measure of DCT endorsement
would mediate the relationship that these measures have
with utilitarian thinking.
In Study 2, we sought to extend our investigation be-
yond utilitarian thinking measured at the level of abstract
principles, to establish DCT as a mediator of the role reli-
giosity plays in contextualized moral judgments. To this
end, we presented a new sample of American participants
a series of naturalistic moral dilemmas in which utilitar-
ian principles and deontological principles were placed in
conflict. The dilemmas covered a range of normative con-
tent, from telling the truth to obeying authority. For each
dilemma, participants rated on a bipolar scale whether
they would favor abiding by the relevant deontological
rule or violating the rule to produce a greater good. Con-
sistent with our hypothesis from Study 1, our prediction
was that an endorsement of DCTwould mediate the nega-
tive relationship between religiosity and preferring a util-
itarian resolution to the dilemma. Additionally, in Study
2, we addressed some alternative explanations for our re-
sults, including differences in moral foundations (Haidt,
2012; Haidt & Graham, 2007) and beliefs about the func-




We recruited a sample of 290 adults (136 male, 154
female; Mage=34.02 years, SD=11.40) via Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk in exchange monetary compensation.
Only individuals located in the United States were al-
lowed to participate. The religiosity of the sample was
20% Protestant, 12% Catholic, 7% Evangelical, 10%
Other Christian, 6% Non-Christian religion (e.g., Jew-
ish, Hindu), 5% Personal spirituality, 15%Agnostic, 22%
Atheist, and 3% None or no religion/faith. The sample
was also politically diverse: 43% Democrat, 19% Repub-
lican, 32% Independent, and 6% other or not political.
2.1.2 Scale development
Twenty statements about God’s role (or, conversely, hu-
mankind’s role) in establishing or determining moral
truths were generated by the authors via rational-
empirical methods. Level of agreement with the items
was assessed on 1 (Strongly disagree) to 9 (Strongly
agree) scales, and responses were submitted to ex-
ploratory factor analysis and tests of convergent and dis-
criminant validity. The twenty-itemMorality Founded on
Divine Authority scale (MFDA), along with loadings for
each item on the first principal component, are presented
in Table 1.
2.1.3 Measures of religiosity
Religiosity was assessed using several different pre-
existing metrics (see appendices for all scales and items).
Since the sample was American, and Christianity is the
dominant religion in the U.S., we included Hunsberger’s
(1992) Short Christian Orthodoxy (SCO) scale (Cron-
bach’s α = .96), which contains six items assessing en-
dorsement of orthodox Christian doctrine. In previous
research, this scale was found to correlate strongly with a
preference for rule-based, as opposed to outcome-based,
moral arguments (Piazza, 2012). We used the Santa Clara
Strength of Religious Faith Questionnaire (SRFQ; Plante
& Boccaccini, 1997; α = .98), which includes ten items
that assess, in a more general and faith-neutral way, the
importance of religious practices and faith within a per-
son’s life. This scale has been shown to predict a deonto-
logical thinking style in past research (Piazza & Sousa, in
press; Study 2). We also included the 12-item Attitude to-
wards Religion (ATR) scale (Piazza, Landy, & Goodwin,
2012; α = .94), which assesses positive attitudes towards
religion and its role in society. All religiosity measures
were assessed in terms of agreement on 1–9 scales. Ad-
ditionally, as a more direct measure of religiosity, partici-
pants rated on a 1–9 scale how religious they are (1 = Not
at all religious; 9 = Extremely religious).
2.1.4 Utilitarian thinking and social conservatism
Utilitarian thinking was assessed via Piazza et al.’s (2013)
Consequentialist Thinking Style scale (CTS; see also Pi-
azza & Sousa, in press), which has participants respond to
13 questions in which they indicated whether a counter-
normative act was never morally permissible (deontolog-
ical response), permissible if it produces more good than
bad (weak utilitarian response) or obligatory if it pro-
duces more good than bad (strong utilitarian response).
The 13 acts were lying, killing, assisted suicide or vol-
untary euthanasia, torture, stealing, incest, cannibalism,
betrayal, deception, gossip, breaking promises, breaking
the law, and treason. We also added a fourteenth item,
abortion, not included in the original thirteen-item scale.3
The 14 items had good internal reliability (α = .85; see
Appendix A for the 14-item scale). We averaged partic-
3All of the analyses were virtually identical when the fourteenth
item, abortion, was omitted, and the internal reliability of the 13-item
CTS index was identical to the 14-item index (α = .85).
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ipants’ responses to the 14 items, ranging from 1 to 3,
such that higher scores represent a stronger commitment
to utilitarian thinking.
Social conservative values were assessed using a re-
vised version of Henningham’s (1996) Scale of Social
Conservatism. Henningham’s original 12-item scale was
designed for an Australian audience over a decade ago.
Some of the items are not relevant for an American au-
dience (e.g., Asian immigration) or are no longer con-
troversial (e.g., multiculturalism). Thus, we revised the
scale with an American audience in mind, using some
items appearing in Putnam and Campbell’s (2010) Faith
Matters Survey, conducted with a U.S. sample. This in-
ternally reliable (α = .77), 13-item scale appears in Ap-
pendix A. Participants indicated their position dichoto-
mously on each social issue by selecting “Opposed to it”
or “NOT opposed to it”.
2.1.5 Actively open-minded thinking
We measured actively open-minded thinking with seven
items from Haran et al.’s (2013) Actively Open-minded
Thinking scale (AOT, α = .79; Appendix A), which par-
ticipants rated in terms of level of agreement on a 1–9
scale. This scale measures a tendency to be open to-
wards revising and updating one’s beliefs in light of new
or contradictory evidence. As a measure of Big Five per-
sonality, we included John and Srivastava’s (1999) 44-
item Big Five Inventory, which provides indices of Extro-
version, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Neuroticism,
and Openness to experience. The Big Five were included
to test for discrimination with the MFDA as a predictor
of utilitarian thinking. Participants rated on a 1–9 scale
how strongly various behavioral tendencies (e.g., “Likes
to reflect, play with ideas”) represents who they are as a
person (for complete list of items, see John & Srivastava,
1999).
2.1.6 Procedure
Participants answered the CTS and social conservatism
items first, followed by the religiosity measures, MFDA,
AOT, Big Five measures, and demographics. No other
measures were included. All participants were debriefed
and paid at the end.
2.2 Results
2.2.1 Scale reliability
The twenty items of our new MFDA scale had a very
high internal reliability (Cronbach’s α = .98). We con-
ducted a principal components analysis, without rotation,
of the twenty items, with parallel analysis (O’Connor,
2000) as our extraction method. Only the first eigenvalue
(14.24, explaining 71.20% of the total variance) exceeded
those derived by chance via parallel analysis. Thus, only
one factor was retained. This factor was comprised of
all twenty items (Table 1); all twenty items loaded well
above the conventional .40 cut-off (Kline, 1994), with the
reverse-scored items exhibiting the weakest loadings.
2.2.2 Convergent and discriminant validity
Table 2 presents zero-order correlations between the
MFDA scale, religiosity, AOT, and outcome variables. As
can be seen, believing that morality rests on God’s author-
ity was found to highly correlate with our other metrics
of religiosity, suggesting good convergent validity. More-
over, dimensions of the Big Five were only weakly cor-
related with MFDA (rs ranged from −.14 [Openness] to
.16 [Agreeableness], ps < .05 except Conscientiousness:
r = .10, p > .10), suggesting good discriminant validity.
As predicted, MFDA negatively correlated with utilitar-
ian thinking and AOT, and positively with social conser-
vatism.
2.2.3 Correlations between self-reported religiosity
and utilitarian thinking
Replicating previous findings (Piazza & Sousa, in press),
self-reported religiosity (measured with a single item)
correlated negatively with utilitarian thinking for thirteen
out of fourteen moral transgressions (rs = −.13 [break-
ing promises] to −.50 [abortion], ps < .03), the excep-
tion being torture, which was unrelated to religiosity (r
= −.04, p = .47), as it was in Piazza and Sousa’s prior
research. Correlations between self-reported religiosity
and utilitarian thinking were very similar when “weak”
and “strong” utilitarian responses were collapsed (= 1)
and scored separately from deontological responses (=
0), Spearman’s ρs ranged from −.15, p < .01 (breaking
promises) to −.52, p < .001 (abortion), with the excep-
tion of torture, ρ =−.06, p = .31. All subsequent analyses
used the conventional three-point CTS score.
2.2.4 Mediation analysis of religiosity metrics and
utilitarian thinking
The main purpose of this research was to demonstrate
that endorsement of DCT accounts for the link between
religiosity and non-utilitarian morality. To formally test
the role of MFDA in mediating this relationship, we used
a series of bootstrapping procedures (Preacher & Hayes,
2004) to estimate 95% confidence intervals (CI) for the
indirect effect of each religiosity measure via MFDA on
utilitarian thinking, using 5,000 bootstrap resamples. We
conducted analyses for all four of our religiosity mea-
sures, with the religiosity measure as the independent
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Table 1: First principal component loadings of the 20-item Morality Founded on Divine Authority (MFDA) scale.
Everything we need to know about living a moral life God has revealed to us. .941
The truth about morality is revealed only by God. .936
Moral truths are revealed to us by God and God alone. .935
What is morally good and right is what God says is good and right. .931
Making the right moral choice depends on having knowledge of God’s laws. .922
The way to live a moral life is revealed to us by God through Holy Scripture. .918
If you want to know how to live a moral life you should look to God. .909
There are a set of moral truths that God has revealed to us to guide our thoughts and actions. .905
Acts that are immoral are immoral because God forbids them. .904
We don’t need to try to figure out what is right and wrong, the answers have already been given to us by God. .901
The way to live a moral life is to follow the example that God has set for us. .899
I trust that God understands what is morally right better than I do. .894
Right and wrong can never be explained with human logic, they can only come from God’s commands. .894
Without God’s revelation, people would have no way to know right from wrong. .881
Without God’s help, our sinful nature prevents us from knowing right from wrong. .876
Just because there is a religious rule against doing something, that does not automatically make it morally
wrong.*
.738
It is possible to live a righteous life without knowledge of God’s laws.* .651
An atheist can still understand what is morally right and wrong.* .607
Without God, humans still have a way to distinguish right from wrong.* .517
It is possible to know right from wrong without God’s help.* .467
* Reverse-scored.
variable, MFDA as the mediator, and CTS as the depen-
dent variable. The 95% CIs for the indirect effect of re-
ligiosity through MFDA did not contain zero in all four
analyses (SFRQ [−.056, −.015]; SCO [−.048, −.010];
ATR [−.073, −.023]; self-reported religiosity [−.070,
−.020]), and the direct effects of religiosity was not sig-
nificant in any analysis, all ps > .07 (ps > .09 using 13-
item CTS).
Importantly, to test the reverse causal direction (de-
gree of religiosity as a mediator of MFDA and utilitarian-
ism) we conducted similar bootstrapping procedures with
our religiosity measures entered as mediators of the rela-
tionship between MFDA and CTS. In all four analyses,
religiosity was not a mediator of MFDA and utilitarian
thinking: the direct effect of MFDA remained significant
all ps < .001 when religiosity was treated as a media-
tor, and the indirect effect of MFDA through religiosity
was not significant (95% CIs SRFQ [−.035, .016]; SCO
[−.042, .002]; ATR [−.031, .005]; self-reported religios-
ity [−.037, .007]).
The preceding findings suggest that endorsement of
DCT accounts for the relationship between religiosity
and non-utilitarian thinking within a religiously diverse
American sample. However, since one of our measures of
religiosity (SCO) was relevant only to religious individu-
als with a Christian faith, it would be important to deter-
mine whether endorsement of DCT also explains differ-
ences in moral orientation within our sub-set of Christian
participants (n = 139) for this measure. Thus, we con-
ducted a separate bootstrapping procedure for the SCO,
this time excluding non-Christian participants from the
sample. MFDA still emerged as a significant mediator of
the relationship Christian Orthodoxy had with utilitarian
thinking style (e.g., the indirect effect of Christian Or-
thodoxy through MFDA 95% CIs [−.066, −.021]; direct
effect, p = .21). Thus, the relationship was robust with
and without non-Christians in the sample.
2.2.5 Mediation analysis of religiosity and social
conservatism
Similar bootstrapping procedures were run for the reli-
giosity measures and social conservatism, treatingMDFA
as the mediating variable. The indirect effect of religios-
ity through MFDA on social conservatism was significant
for all four religiosity measures (95% CIs SRFQ [.030,
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Table 2: Correlation matrix of religiosity, AOT, and outcome variables from Study 1 (Pearson’s r used for all columns
except Social Conservatism, which used Spearman’s ρ). MFDA = Morality Founded on Divine Authority scale; SCO
= Short Christian Orthodoxy scale; SRFQ = Santa Clara Strength of Religious Faith Questionnaire; ATR = Attitude
towards Religion scale. AOT = Actively Open-minded Thinking scale. CTS = Consequentialist Thinking Style scale.
All presented correlations are statistically significant, ps < .001.
MFDA SCO SRFQ ATR AOT CTS
Social
conserv.
Self-reported religiosity .82 .81 .90 .74 −.58 −.43 .62
MFDA . .86 .87 .76 −.70 −.48 .68
SCO . . .89 .85 −.63 −.45 .62
SRFQ . . . .81 −.59 −.43 .60
ATR . . . . −.58 −.41 .55
AOT . . . . . .42 −.59
CTS . . . . . . −.48
.053]; SCO [.033, .058]; ATR [.047, .074], self-reported
religiosity [.039, .070]; direct effects, all ps > .092).
2.2.6 MFDA predicts utilitarian thinking indepen-
dent of AOT and the Big Five
When MFDA was entered into a regression as a predictor
of utilitarian thinking simultaneously with the Big Five
and AOT, it remained a significant independent predic-
tor, β = −.31,4 t(282) = −4.37, p < .001, along with
AOT, β = .17, t(282) = 2.43, p < .02, Agreeableness, β
= −.25, t(282) = −4.43, p < .001, and Conscientious-
ness, β = −.15, t(282) = −2.58, p = .01 (all other βs <
.07, ps > .24). In a similar analysis for social conser-
vatism, MFDA remained a significant independent pre-
dictor, β = .59 (compared to .68 without additional co-
variates), t(282) = 10.08, p < .001, along with AOT, β
= −.16, t(282) = −2.70, p < .01, and Conscientiousness,
β = .13, t(282) = 2.55, p = .01 (all other βs < .08, ps >
.14). Thus, endorsement of divine command theory was
an important predictor of utilitarian thinking independent
of other relevant personality dimensions, such as how ac-
tively open-minded, conscientious, or agreeable a person
is.
2.3 Discussion
The results of Study 1 largely confirmed our hypothe-
sis that differences in meta-ethics account in large part
for the relationship between religiosity and moral think-
ing styles. Furthermore, the results confirmed the valid-
ity of our measure of DCT endorsement: MFDA showed
high internal reliability, as well as clear convergent and
4However, the raw coefficient without additional covariates was
−.48, as shown in Table 2.
discriminant validity. Regarding convergent validity, the
MFDA correlated positively with other existing measures
of religiosity, each emphasizing a slightly different aspect
of religiosity (e.g., beliefs vs. practices). Regarding dis-
criminant validity, the MFDAwas only weakly correlated
with theoretically unrelated personality constructs, such
as the Big Five dimensions. Furthermore, the MFDA
fully mediated the relationship each religiosity measure
had with a utilitarian thinking style, as well as social con-
servatism. The MFDA also retained a strong relationship
with both utilitarian thinking and social conservatism in-
dependent from measures of AOT and the Big Five.
3 Study 2
Despite these promising results, Study 1 had some limita-
tions that we sought to overcome in Study 2. First, Study
1 did not rule out a plausible alternative explanation for
our findings—namely, that endorsement of divine com-
mand theory might derive from a more general concern
for authority, broadly defined. According to Moral Foun-
dations Theory (MFT; Haidt & Graham, 2007), respect
for authority is a virtue emphasized in many cultures and
was shaped by our evolutionary history as primates liv-
ing in hierarchically-structured groups of dominant and
submissive members. It is known that political conser-
vatives in America are more concerned with this moral
foundation than liberals (Graham et al., 2009). Thus, it
could be that belief in DCT is part of a more general con-
cern for respecting legitimate authorities—including, but
not limited to, God’s authority. Study 2 sought to address
this possibility, by including in our analysis the Author-
ity subscale of the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (or
MFQ; Graham et al., 2009).
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Another untested variable that might explain our find-
ings has to do with differences in the perceived function
of rules. As discussed earlier, a fundamental tenet of
Judeo-Christian faith is that humans are naturally sinful,
and their wisdom is inferior to the supreme wisdom of
God. Pessimism about the human condition might pro-
mote a deontological ethic: if humans are incapable of
making good moral decisions on their own—for exam-
ple, if we cannot figure out, in a given situation, what
the right course of action is—then moral rules (revealed
by God and grounded in His infallible wisdom) become
necessary to guide us towards making ethical decisions.
Thus, a belief in original sin, or the inherent corruptness
of human nature and the fallibility of human judgment,
might explain why religious individuals exhibit a strong
commitment to deontological ethics—it is because they
tend to see moral rules as functioning to prevent peo-
ple from naturally making the wrong decision by trust-
ing their own corrupt and imperfect judgment over God’s
perfect judgment.
We tested this possibility in Study 2 using a new mea-
sure that we designed to discriminate between four pos-
sible functions people may perceive moral rules to ful-
fill: (1) rules protect people from one another (welfare
function); (2) rules prevent one person from having an
unfair advantage over another (fairness function); (3)
rules guide people to make better moral judgments than
they would on their own (guidance function—humans are
fallible); (4) rules guide people to act better than they
would on their own (guidance function—humans are nat-
urally sinful). The first two functions are consistent with
the harm principle of criminal law (i.e., that all persons
are entitled to protection from harm from other persons;
Feinberg, 1984), and basic contractualist notions of jus-
tice (e.g., the Rawlsian notion that the moral principles
people agree to should apply to all persons equally, re-
gardless of race, sex, station, etc.; Rawls, 1971), while
the latter two relate to our discussion of original sin and
pessimism about human judgment. We made no predic-
tions about whether the welfare and fairness functions
would discriminate between religious and non-religious
individuals, but we nevertheless included them for com-
pleteness. Instead, our main interest was the “guidance”
functions. We predicted that religiosity would correlate
with a perception that rules exist to counteract human fal-
libility and natural sinfulness, but we did not expect this
variable to account for the relationship between religios-
ity and utilitarianism over and above the mediating role
of DCT endorsement.
Furthermore, in Study 1, utilitarian decision-making
was measured in relation to abstract situations, rather than
contextualized events. If endorsement of DCT is truly
what underlies the relationship religiosity has with de-
ontological thinking, then we should be able to replicate
our results at the level of specific moral dilemmas. To this
end, in Study 2 we assessed utilitarian thinking via partic-
ipants’ judgments of a variety of moral dilemmas which
placed deontological principles in conflict with utilitarian
ones, in order to show that our results generalize from
global endorsement of moral principles to resolution of
specific dilemmatic moral judgments.
Lastly, in addition to these primary objectives, Study
2 also investigated one ancillary issue pertaining to
the relationship between religiosity and Moral Foun-
dations Theory (Graham et al., 2009; Haidt & Gra-
ham, 2007). MFT is a theory about the content of
people’s moral judgments. It argues that there are at
least five (possibly six)5 distinct foundations, or do-
mains of moral condemnation, grounded in five intuitive
“moral systems” in the brain. These foundations include:
Harm/care, Fairness/cheating, Loyalty/betrayal, Author-
ity/disrespect, and Sanctity6/degradation. According to
MFT, each moral system was designed by natural selec-
tion to respond to a unique set of social input; for ex-
ample, it is postulated that the Care foundation is acti-
vated by signs of pain and suffering, while the Author-
ity foundation is activated by insubordination directed
at respected leaders or authorities. MFT proposes that,
although human societies differ in the degree to which
they promote the cultivation of each foundation, all hu-
man beings possess the intuitive architecture supporting
processes related to each (Haidt, 2012; Haidt & Graham,
2007).
Consistent with this idea, research on MFT has found
that specific individuals within American society differ
in terms of how strongly they utilize content from each
foundation within their moral judgments. In particular,
Graham et al. (2009) found that political conservatives in
America tend to utilize content from all five foundations
in their moral judgments, while American liberals utilize
mostly content from the Care and Fairness foundations.
According to Graham et al., the reason that liberals dis-
count content related to Authority, Loyalty, and Sanctity
in their moral judgments has mostly to do with the “so-
cial function” of these three foundations. It is argued that
the foundations of Authority, Loyalty, and Sanctity func-
tion primarily to limit the advance of individualism and
self-expression, and to “bind together” people into groups
such as families, tribes, and nations. It is surmised that,
because liberals value autonomy and have a reduced in-
5Recent discussion of MFT by Haidt (2012) posits a possible sixth
“moral foundation” pertaining to the human motivation to band together
to overthrow oppressive leadership in the pursuit of greater liberty and
autonomy. Because very little empirical work has been brought to bear
on this putative, sixth foundation, we restrict our discussion and meth-
ods to the original five foundations postulated by Haidt and Graham
(2007).
6Some iterations of MFT label this foundation as Purity, rather than
Sanctity.
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vestment in group-based enterprises, relative to conser-
vatives, their lack of group-oriented values are reflected
in their moral judgments (i.e., in their lack of concern
for violations of authority, loyalty, or sanctity). A simi-
lar argument has been offered to account for differences
in religious and non-religious individuals (see Graham &
Haidt, 2010; Haidt, 2012).
Though we do not challenge the legitimacy of this
“social function” explanation for why American liber-
als and conservatives differ in their valuing of differ-
ent moral content, we do question whether differences
in group orientation are sufficient, or even necessary, to
explain why religious individuals, but not non-religious
individuals, might prioritize concerns beyond those of
harm or fairness. We propose instead that one princi-
pal reason religious individuals have a more expansive
set of foundations (or moral concerns) is due to their
meta-ethical belief that morality is founded upon divine
authority. Insofar as divine commands (codified in re-
ligious texts) generally cover a broader range of issues
than those pertaining to welfare and fairness, including
obedience to authority, loyalty to one’s ingroups, and,
in particular, concern for sexual/bodily purity (see foot-
note for examples),7 we expect endorsement of DCT to
account for much of the relationship religiosity has with
the “binding” moral foundations. Specifically, we predict
that endorsement of DCT will mediate the relationship
religiosity has with Authority, Loyalty, and Sanctity—




We recruited a new sample of 211 adult participants (99
female; Mage = 33.24 years, SD = 12.23) via the same
web service in exchange for monetary compensation. Re-
cruitment was limited to individuals located in the U.S.
The sample was religiously diverse: 16% Protestant, 14%
7The Hebrew Bible and New Testament of the Judeo-Christian faiths
cover a range of social issues beyond those pertaining to justice and car-
ing for others. This includes issues related to obeying parental and gov-
erning authority (Deuteronomy 5:16; Ecclesiastes 8:2; Ezra 7:26; Ro-
mans 13:1), ingroup loyalty (1 Corinthians 16:13; Exodus 20:1–8), and
sanctity: sexual fidelity (Exodus 20:14; 1 Corinthians 7:1–4; Matthew
19:9), chastity (Deuteronomy 22:20-21), bodily purity (I Corinthians
6:19-20; Leviticus 11:1–47, 19:28), sexual orientation (1 Corinthians
6:9; Leviticus 20:13), lust (Matthew 5:28), envy (1 Colossians 3:5;
Galatians 5:26), modesty (Matthew 5:5; 1 Timothy 2:9-10), temperance
(Matthew 19:21–24; Galatians 5:22-23; Romans 13:13), sobriety (Gala-
tians 5:19-21), even cross-dressing (Deuteronomy 22:5). Likewise, the
Qur’an (the holy text of Islam) covers a range of social issues, includ-
ing submitting to God and parental authorities, loyalty, and purity (sex-
ual fidelity, modesty, not being wasteful), in addition to keeping one’s
promises, caring for orphans, showing mercy, and being fair in one’s
economic dealings (see Qur’an 17:23-37).
Catholic, 4% Evangelical, 12% other Christian faith, 4%
Jewish, 2% Hindu, 2% Buddhist, 2% other religion/faith,
5% Personal Spirituality, 19% Atheist, 14% Agnostic,
6% no religion/faith. The sample was also politically di-
verse: 43% Democrat, 18% Republican, 37% Indepen-
dent, 2% other or not political.
3.1.2 Procedures
Participants answered 11 moral dilemmas, three ques-
tionnaires, and demographic questions, including self-
reported religiosity, political orientation, level of educa-
tion, and socioeconomic status. Whether or not partici-
pants completed the dilemmas prior to the questionnaires
was counterbalanced. All participants were debriefed and
paid at the end.
3.1.3 Materials
Moral dilemmas. We developed 11 moral dilemma
scenarios in which a decision had to be made between ad-
hering to a deontological rule (e.g., do not lie) or break-
ing that rule to produce a greater overall good outcome
(see Appendix B for all eleven dilemmas). These sce-
narios therefore have the same basic structure as utili-
tarian dilemmas used extensively in other research (e.g.,
Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001;
Paxton et al., 2012). However, whereas the dilemmas
used in prior research focus exclusively on breaking the
deontological prohibition on killing in order to save more
lives (so-called “trolley-type” dilemmas, named for the
famous trolley problem), our dilemmas presented situa-
tions in which a wide range of deontological rules, not
just those pertaining to killing, could be broken to pro-
duce better consequences. Many of these rules over-
lapped with those assessed by the CTS in Study 1 (e.g.,
lying, infidelity, breaking promises, etc.). Our materials
therefore offered a more complete assessment of whether
a person’s moral judgments are generally deontological
or utilitarian. They were also intended to be somewhat
less stylized and more naturalistic than classic trolley-
type dilemmas, which have been criticized for their sever-
ity and exoticness (e.g., see Bartels & Pizarro, 2011). Par-
ticipants indicated what they felt they should do in each
situation on a 1–9 scale ranging from “definitely should
[action obeying the deontological rule]” to “definitely
should [action breaking the deontological rule]” and an-
chored at the midpoint by “I’m completely divided about
what to do.” Higher scores therefore indicated a greater
endorsement of a utilitarian resolution to the dilemma.
Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ). The 30-
item Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ; see Gra-
ham, Nosek, Haidt, Iyer, Koleva, & Ditto, 2011, for ma-
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terials), assesses commitment to the five broad “founda-
tions” of morality postulated by MFT. The survey con-
sists of two parts. The first part asks participants to rate
the relevance of several factors when making moral judg-
ments (e.g., “whether or not someone was cruel” for the
Care foundation). The second part assesses agreement
with a variety of statements that reflect or negate one of
the five foundations (e.g., “I am proud of my country’s
history” for Loyalty). The items were administered using
the standard zero-to-five response scales (see Graham et
al., 2009). Part 1 was presented before Part 2, and the
order of question presentation within each part was ran-
domized for each participant.
Perceived function of rules. To assess participants’
pessimism about human nature and humankind’s ability
to make responsible choices in the absence of moral rules,
we developed twelve items assessing what participants
considered to be the function of moral rules. Specifically,
participants were instructed: “Think about the rules that
people in society should strive to abide by—the rules one
can be punished for failing to keep. Then answer the fol-
lowing statements in terms of your level of agreement or
disagreement about why those rules are in place.” Partic-
ipants then rated their agreement with twelve statements
on a 9-point scale. Three items assessed pessimism about
human morality because of the perceived sinful nature of
humanity (e.g., “The rules exist to prevent people from
acting on their natural, sinful impulses”). These items
therefore assessed an “original sin” view of humanity.
Three more items assessed a more general view that hu-
man judgment is unreliable or fallible, though not neces-
sarily inherently evil (e.g., “The rules exist because peo-
ple do not always know what the best course of action
is”). The other six items were comprised of three items
assessing harm-based and fairness-based justifications for
the existence of rules (e.g., “The rules exist to stop peo-
ple from hurting each other”; “The rules exist to create
an equal playing field for all”). These latter six items
were not related to pessimism about human moral judg-
ment and were therefore of less immediate theoretical in-
terest. The order of presentation of the twelve items was
randomized for each participant; see Appendix C for all
twelve items.
Morality is Founded on Divine Authority (MFDA).
The 20-item MFDA scale was administered as in Study
1 on a 9-point scale. The reliability of the scale was very
strong (α = .97).
Religiosity and political orientation. Self-reported re-
ligiosity was assessed with the same single-item measure
from Study 1. Political orientation was measured via two
items in which participants reported their political views
on social issues and, separately, economic issues, on a
7-point bipolar scale (1 = Very liberal; 7 = Very conser-
vative). The two items (α = .86) were aggregated into a
single index with higher scores representing greater po-
litical conservatism. Level of education was measured on
a scale from 1 (Some high school education) to 7 (Gradu-
ate degree, Doctorate). Socioeconomic status (SES) was
measured via the MacArthur Scale of Subjective Social
Status (see Adler, Epel, Castellazzo, & Ickovics, 2000).
Measures of SES and education were included based on
some research that has linked higher social class to lower
religiosity (Paul, 2010), decreased concern for the wel-
fare of others (Stellar, Manzo, Kraus, & Keltner, 2012),
and an increased concern for rule compliance (Lammers
& Stapel, 2009).
3.2 Results
3.2.1 Factor analysis of Function of Rules items
Before using our new function of rules measure in our
analysis, we first wanted to explore whether the four sub-
scales were differentiated from each other in the man-
ner that we intended. To test this, we submitted partici-
pants’ responses to the 12 items to Principal Components
Analysis with Varimax rotation. Based on the results of a
parallel analysis (O’Connor, 2000), two factors were re-
tained. The first factor (eigenvalue = 5.11) consisted of
the Welfare and Fairness items, and the second (eigen-
value = 2.53) consisted of the Guidance items (fallible
and sinful). Factor loadings were acceptably high (> .62),
and cross-loadings were generally low (< .41). On the ba-
sis of this analysis, we combined theWelfare and Fairness
items and the sinful and fallible Guidance items, giving
us two final scales tapping participants’ beliefs about why
rules exist, one related to traditional legal and philosophi-
cal justifications about preventing harm and ensuring fair-
ness, and another related to beliefs that humans are at best
flawed decision makers and at worst inherently evil, and
therefore need rules to guide them. We used these two
six-item scales in all subsequent analyses.
3.2.2 Preliminary analysis of religiosity, MFDA, po-
litical conservatism, and utilitarian decisions
Table 3 presents the correlations between self-reported
religiosity, political conservatism, and utilitarian re-
sponding to each dilemma. It can be seen that religios-
ity correlated with utilitarian responding in the predicted
direction in ten out of 11 dilemmas. We also averaged
responses to the 11 moral dilemmas to create an index of
utilitarian thinking (α = .68). Consistent with the find-
ings of Study 1, there was an overall moderate, negative
correlation between self-reported religiosity and average
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Table 3: Pearson correlations between religiosity and political conservatism, Morality Founded on Divine Authority























Religiosity −.14∗ .06 −.04 −.38∗ −.28∗ −.17 −.12 −.33∗ −.02 −.34∗ −.43∗ −.43∗
Pol. con-
servatism
−.05 −.05 .01 −.24∗ −.20∗ −.07 .03 −.24∗ −.07 −.28∗ −.27∗ −.27∗
MFDA −.11 −.02 −.08 −.40∗ −.31∗ −.11 −.09 −.35∗ −.05 −.38∗ −.47∗ −.47∗
utilitarianism scores (Table 3). Moreover, we also ob-
served a moderate negative correlation between political
conservatism and utilitarianism (Table 3). This negative
relationship was observed for all but two of the individ-
ual dilemmas. Therefore, the previous result that reli-
gious and conservative individuals tend to be less utili-
tarian in their moral thinking (Piazza & Sousa, in press)
replicates when utilitarianism is measured using specific
moral dilemmas rather than measures of general endorse-
ment of utilitarianism. In addition, the MFDA was nega-
tively correlated with utilitarian responding for all eleven
dilemmas (Table 3).
Zero-order correlations between the main variables of
Study 2 are presented in Table 4. Noteworthy was a sig-
nificant negative relationship between the guidance func-
tion of rules subscale and our index of utilitarian judg-
ments. As predicted, perceiving rules as existing to coun-
teract human fallibility and inherent sinfulness correlated
with a tendency to make deontological judgments.
To further probe the negative relationship between
MFDA and utilitarian responding, we conducted a step-
wise linear regression (Table 5). We first entered ba-
sic demographic variables including religiosity and po-
litical conservatism as predictors in step 1. Religiosity
was the only significant (negative) predictor of utilitarian
responding in this model. In step 2, we added MFDA.
In this model, MFDA significantly negatively predicted
utilitarian responding, but the predictive effect of self-
reported religiosity did not remain significant when in-
cluding MFDA in the model. In step 3, we added the
responses to the function of rules items, and in step 4
we added the MFQ, but neither of these additions sig-
nificantly improved model fit. The only significant pre-
dictor of utilitarian responding in the final model was
MFDA (Table 5). The association between endorsement
of divine command theory and deontological morality is
therefore highly robust, and cannot be explained by dif-
ferences in religious and non-religious individuals’ be-
liefs about the function of rules, level of education or
SES, or endorsement of different moral foundations.
3.2.3 Mediation analysis
We next sought to demonstrate again that the MFDA me-
diates the zero-order association between self-reported
religiosity and deontological responding. As in Study 1,
we conducted a bootstrapping analysis with 5,000 resam-
ples. The indirect effect of religiosity on utilitarian de-
cisions through MFDA was significant (95% CI [−.241,
−.065]). Moreover, the direct effect of religiosity on util-
itarian responding was not significant when controlling
for MFDA (p = .07), as in the above regression analysis.
Also, in a reverse mediation analysis, where religiosity
was treated as the mediator of MFDA and utilitarian de-
cisions, the indirect effect through religiosity was not sig-
nificant (95% CIs [−.168, .001]). In short, endorsement
of DCT fully mediated the relationship between religios-
ity and utilitarian moral judgment—i.e., DCT is the part
of being religious that seems to account for the deonto-
logical leanings of religious individuals.
We sought to test a secondary hypothesis that endorse-
ment of divine command theory also mediates the rela-
tionship religiosity has with the “binding” moral founda-
tions. Thus, we conducted a series of bootstrapping pro-
cedures, in which MFDA scores were entered as the me-
diator of religiosity and each of the binding foundation
subscales (Sanctity, Loyalty, and Authority). We used
5,000 resamples for each analysis. As can be seen in
Figure 1, MFDA significantly mediated the relationship
between religiosity and sanctity (95% CIs [.28, .44]), re-
ligiosity and loyalty (95% CIs [.05, .20]), and religios-
ity and authority (95% CIs [.15, .31]). For each of the
analyses, the direct effect of religiosity on the founda-
tion was non-significant after accounting for the indirect
effect through MFDA. Thus, perceiving morality to be
founded on divine authority fully mediated the relation-
ship that religiosity has with the “binding” foundations in
our American sample.
We ran similar mediation analyses with political con-
servatism as the independent variable. While MFDA was
a significant mediator for all three binding foundations
(95% CIs, sanctity [.22, .37]; loyalty [.03, .15]; authority
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Table 4: Pearson correlations between the main variables from Study 2. MFDA = Morality is Founded on Divine
Authority scale. N = 211. ∗ p < .05. ∗∗ p < .01. ∗∗∗ p < .001.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1. MFDA .80∗∗∗ .58∗∗∗ .18∗∗ .40∗∗∗ .10 −.07 .53∗∗∗ .72∗∗∗ .37∗∗∗ −.47∗∗∗
2. Religiosity . .50∗∗∗ .17∗ .25∗∗∗ .12 .00 .40∗∗∗ .57∗∗∗ .31∗∗∗ −.43∗∗∗
3. Pol. Conservatism . . .08 .26∗∗∗ −.11 −.28∗∗∗ .51∗∗∗ .52∗∗∗ .36∗∗∗ −.27∗∗∗
4. Rules-Welfare/Fair. . . . .36∗∗∗ .25∗∗∗ .20∗∗ .29∗∗∗ .17∗ .29∗∗∗ −.17∗
5. Rules-Guidance . . . . −.01 .00 .46∗∗∗ .44∗∗∗ .36∗∗∗ −.14∗
6. Care . . . . . .51∗∗∗ .16∗ .18∗∗ .22∗∗ −.09
7. Fairness . . . . . . .03 .04 .06 .02
8. Authority . . . . . . . .73∗∗∗ .77∗∗∗ −.24∗∗
9. Sanctity . . . . . . . . .62∗∗∗ −.38∗∗∗
10. Loyalty . . . . . . . . . −.17∗
11. Utilitarian index . . . . . . . . . .
[.07, .20]), the direct effect of conservatism on the foun-
dations remained significant (ps < .01), revealing that be-
lieving that morality is founded on divine authority only
partly mediated the relationship conservatism has with
these “binding” foundations.
3.3 Discussion
Study 2 once again replicated the negative relationship
between religiosity and utilitarianism, this time measured
using naturalistic dilemmatic scenarios. This indicates
that religiosity does not just predict deontological judg-
ments in the abstract (“It is never morally permissible to
lie”), but it also does so in the context of specific, natural-
istic decisions (“I should not lie about my friend’s appear-
ance to protect her feelings”). Moreover, this association
between religiosity and deontology was fully mediated
by religious individuals’ greater endorsement of DCT, as
measured by our MFDA scale.
The MFDA was uniquely associated with non-
utilitarian responding, even when statistically controlling
for other relevant variables, such as social class, beliefs
about why moral rules exist, and individual differences in
moral foundations, variables that played only a small role
at most. This suggests that MFDA is not just acting as
an imperfect proxy for some other belief about morality,
which speaks to the discriminant and construct validity
of the scale. On the basis of Study 1’s results, it could be
hypothesized that MFDA was simply a proxy for respect
for authority in general as a morally important attribute,
or that it was a proxy for a belief in the inadequacy of hu-
man judgment or the inherent corruptness of human na-
ture. Study 2 has ruled out both of these possibilities. A
belief that morality is founded on divine moral authority
appears to be the critical mediator of the negative rela-
tionship between religiosity and utilitarianism. It seems
that one’s beliefs about the ultimate foundation or source
of morality are at least as important in predicting down-
stream moral judgment as the domains of morality that
one endorses.
4 General discussion
The present studies provide an answer to the question
of why religious individuals exhibit an aversion towards
utilitarian moral thinking. Our findings indicate that a
belief that morality is founded on divine moral author-
ity, as opposed to human reason or intuition, is the part
of religiosity that promotes deontological moral judg-
ments. In Study 1, we developed the Morality is Founded
on Divine Authority scale (MFDA), the first psycho-
metric instrument designed specifically to measure en-
dorsement of Divine Command Theory (DCT). MFDA
showed good convergent validity, correlating with estab-
lished measures of religiosity, and discriminant validity,
correlating weakly, if at all, with theoretically unrelated
aspects of personality. Moreover, MFDA fully mediated
the relationship various measures of religiosity had with a
non-utilitarian response style, including measures related
to religious identity, belief, and practices. Study 2 pro-
vided further evidence that endorsement of DCT is the
critical mediating variable by again showing that MFDA
fully mediated the relationship between religiosity and
utilitarianism, this time measured via discrete judgments
in response to several naturalistic moral dilemmas. Study
2 also showed that the relationship between MFDA and
non-utilitarianism is not accounted for by religious in-
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Table 5: Stepwise linear regression: Standardized regression coefficients predicting utilitarian decisions (Study 2).
MFDA = Morality is Founded on Divine Authority scale. MFQ = Moral Foundations Questionnaire. N = 211. ∗
p < .05. ∗∗ p < .01. ∗∗∗ p < .001.
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 R2 change
Demographics .207∗∗∗
Religiosity −.39∗∗∗ −.18 −.16 −.16
Political conservatism −.09 −.02 −.03 −.02
SES −.08 −.05 −.05 −.06
Education −.03 −.04 −.03 −.03
MFDA − −.31∗∗ −.34∗∗ −.26∗ .030∗∗
Function of Rules .012
Welfare/ Fairness −.11 −.13







dividuals’ greater concern with respecting authority in
general, rather than God’s moral authority in particu-
lar, or their endorsement of the belief that deontological
rules are necessary to prevent people from making flawed
moral choices. Our results converge on the conclusion
that a belief in God’s moral authority is a key variable
that accounts for the association between religiosity and a
rejection of utilitarian morality observed in previous stud-
ies. Furthermore, this research complements other recent
work on meta-ethical beliefs (e.g., Goodwin & Darley,
2008, 2012) by further illuminating the important role
these beliefs play in guiding folk moral judgments.
4.1 Divine Command Theory and Moral
Foundations
Study 2 demonstrated that the association between reli-
giosity and deontology is not explained by religious in-
dividuals’ greater concern with the foundations pertain-
ing to Ingroup loyalty, Authority, and Sanctity posited
by Moral Foundations Theory (MFT). Quite the contrary,
MFDA fully mediated the association between religios-
ity and endorsement of these so-called “binding” foun-
dations. It has been suggested that religious individuals
are more group-oriented, and therefore are more likely to
view issues of Loyalty, Authority, and Sanctity as rele-
vant to their moral judgments (Graham & Haidt, 2010).
Our results suggest, instead, that the meta-ethical be-
lief that morality is founded upon God’s moral authority
is sufficient to account for the association between reli-
giosity and endorsement of the “binding” moral founda-
tions, at least within our American sample. We believe
these mediational results reflect the fact that holy texts
(e.g., the Bible or Qur’an), which are perceived by believ-
ers to contain the revealed will of God for moral living,
cover a wide range of topics, including those pertaining to
group loyalty, respect for authority, and sexual/bodily pu-
rity (see earlier references). Insofar as these foundations
are mentioned in holy texts as being important to moral
living, a divine command theorist would accept them as
valued principles and, accordingly, prioritize them within
their everyday moral judgments.
Of course our findings do not explain how religious
faiths and communities themselves come to prioritize
these concerns (i.e., how these topics find their way into
religious texts in the first place); they only help illuminate
the vehicle by which religious adherents in American so-
ciety might come to prioritize them. Though we have
not ruled out a “social function” or group-orientation ac-
count for this difference in moral values, we have shown
endorsement of DCT to fully mediate the relationship be-
tween religiosity and the binding foundations, and while
it is possible that being group-oriented is really what
drives people to endorse DCT, we find it unlikely. Still,
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Figure 1: Endorsement of divine command theory me-
diated the negative relationship religiosity had with the
“binding” moral foundations (Study 2). MFDA = Moral-
ity is Founded on Divine Authority scale. Total effect in






















further research is needed to directly test the social func-
tion account proposed by Graham and Haidt (2010), and
contrast it with our alternative account, as well as to rule
out other untested third variables. There is certainly a
complex mesh of interactive factors underlying belief in
God and DCT—some of which may involve group-level
processes. Suffice to say, our results regarding the rela-
tionship between political orientation and moral founda-
tions in Study 2 (MFDA only partially mediated the rela-
tionship) leaves open the possibility that a social function
account may be required to help differentiate folk moral-
ity along the political spectrum.
More broadly, our results speak to the importance of
people’s meta-ethical beliefs in motivating their moral
judgments. Lay beliefs about meta-ethics are under-
studied in psychology. Nevertheless, as our results at-
test, it appears that moral judgments can sometimes
be better predicted by people’s beliefs about the nature
of morality—specifically, whether moral truths originate
with God or may be obtained via human reason—than
by the content of their moral codes, since in Study 2
we found MFDA to uniquely predict deontological judg-
ments, whereas differences in moral foundations did not.
Thus, lay meta-ethics has the potential to be an exciting
and important topic of research in the future.
4.2 Limitations and future directions
Perhaps the largest and most obvious limitation is that our
sample consisted entirely of Americans, and the vast ma-
jority of our religiously-affiliated participants were Chris-
tians. This obviously limits the generalizability of our
findings to other religions, such as Hinduism or Bud-
dhism. Nevertheless, we focused on Western religions,
and Christianity in particular, for three reasons. First,
we thought that avoiding cultural heterogeneity in our
sample would diminish the potential for unobserved third
variables (e.g., individualism vs. collectivism) to creep
in and reduce the internal validity of our results. Sec-
ond, prior research that has established the relationship
between religiosity and non-utilitarian thinking (e.g., Pi-
azza, 2012; Piazza & Sousa, in press) was conducted
primarily with Western (U.S. and UK), largely Christian
samples. It has not yet been established whether this re-
lationship exists in other cultures and religions, and our
aim here was to explain the relationship shown by prior
studies, not to test its generalizability to other cultural
milieus. Finally, expressions of DCT are quite promi-
nent in the holy texts of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam
(see references in section 1.2), while they are less promi-
nent in Eastern religions such as Hinduism and Bud-
dhism. Indeed, many branches of Buddhism are non-
theistic (e.g., Zen); furthermore, many Eastern, panthe-
istic religions often preclude the possibility of a moraliz-
ing, high God, who issues moral commands and demands
obedience (though see Baumard & Boyer, in press, for
possible exceptions). Therefore, if the zero-order rela-
tionship between religiosity and deontological thinking
does generalize to Eastern religions, we might not expect
endorsement of DCT to be the critical mediating vari-
able in those cultures, though we would expect this to
be the case for Jews and Muslims, who share this feature
in common with Christians. Cross-cultural research on
the relationship between religiosity, DCT, and utilitarian
thinking is obviously an interesting and important direc-
tion for future research.
Another limitation of the present work is that it
is cross-sectional (rather than longitudinal) and corre-
lational. Therefore, we cannot definitively establish
whether endorsement of DCT causes people to resist util-
itarian thinking, or whether a preexisting deontological
thinking style predisposes people to endorse DCT. While
both of these causal links are plausible, we believe the
former is more likely in naturalistic settings given that
aspects of DCT (such as God being supremely wise and
just and the source of all things) are explicitly taught
by religious institutions across America and are embod-
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ied in religious doctrine (e.g., see the Apostles Creed
and Nicene Creed), while deontological ethics are proba-
bly less explicitly transmitted through religious teaching
(though see the Catechism of the Catholic Church, Part
Three, Article 4 “The Morality of Human Acts,” with re-
gards to certain acts being inherently evil independent of
their consequences8) and less essential to religious faith;
that is, one can be a deontologist on non-theistic grounds
(see Gert, 2004; Kant, 1785/1964).
4.3 Conclusion
The present research aimed to clarify the well-established
negative relationship between religiosity and utilitarian
moral thinking. This association appears to a great ex-
tent attributable to religious individuals’ endorsement of
God’s moral authority, as measured by our novel MFDA
scale. This research demonstrates the importance of un-
derstanding the role of meta-ethical beliefs in shaping
moral judgment over and above the role of individual dif-
ferences in moral foundations. Beliefs about what makes
an act right or wrong—for example, whether or not God
has issued a command obligating or forbidding acts of a
certain kind—may be just as important to people’s moral
judgments as the specific features of an act, its conse-
quences, or the domain of behavior it may belong to.
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Appendix A: Scales used in Study 1
not provided in text
Consequentialist Thinking Style scale
Below are a number of different actions a person can
perform. Please indicate your moral position concerning
each action. Please read each option before selecting the
one that best represents your position.
Which of the following statements best characterizes
your position on killing? (Select one)
1. It is never morally permissible to kill someone.
2. If killing someone will produce greater good than
bad consequences, then it is morally permissible to
kill that person.
3. If killing someone will produce greater good than
bad consequences, then it is morally obligatory to
kill that person.
Which of the following statements best characterizes
your position on assisted suicide or voluntary euthanasia?
(Select one)
1. It is never morally permissible to assist someone in
ending their life.
2. If assisted suicide will produce greater good than
bad consequences, then it is morally permissible to
assist someone in ending their life.
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3. If assisted suicide will produce greater good than
bad consequences, then it is morally obligatory to
assist someone in ending their life.
Which of the following statements best characterizes
your position on abortion? (Select one)
1. It is never morally permissible to have an abortion.
2. If an abortion will produce greater good than bad
consequences, then it is morally permissible to have
an abortion.
3. If an abortion will produce greater good than bad
consequences, then it is morally obligatory to have
an abortion.
Which of the following statements best characterizes
your position on torture? (Select one)
1. It is never morally permissible to torture someone.
2. If torture will produce greater good than bad con-
sequences, then it is morally permissible to torture
someone.
3. If torture will produce greater good than bad con-
sequences, then it is morally obligatory to torture
someone.
Which of the following statements best characterizes
your position on lying? (Select one)
1. It is never morally permissible to lie.
2. If lying will produce greater good than bad conse-
quences, then it is morally permissible to lie.
3. If lying will produce greater good than bad conse-
quences, then it is morally obligatory to lie.
Which of the following statements best characterizes
your position on stealing? (Select one)
1. It is never morally permissible to steal.
2. If stealing will produce greater good than bad con-
sequences, then it is morally permissible to steal.
3. If stealing will produce greater good than bad con-
sequences, then it is morally obligatory to steal.
Which of the following statements best characterizes
your position on incest? (Select one)
1. It is never morally permissible to have sexual rela-
tions with a family member.
2. If incest will produce greater good than bad conse-
quences, then it is morally permissible to have sex-
ual relations with a family member.
3. If incest will produce greater good than bad conse-
quences, then it is morally obligatory to have sexual
relations with a family member.
Which of the following statements best characterizes
your position on cannibalism? (Select one)
1. It is never morally permissible to eat the flesh of a
dead person.
2. If cannibalism will produce greater good than bad
consequences, then it is morally permissible to eat
the flesh of a dead person.
3. If cannibalism will produce greater good than bad
consequences, then it is morally obligatory to eat the
flesh of a dead person.
Which of the following statements best characterizes
your position on betrayal? (Select one)
1. It is never morally permissible to betray someone.
2. If betraying someone will produce greater good than
bad consequences, then it is morally permissible to
betray that person.
3. If betraying someone will produce greater good than
bad consequences, then it is morally obligatory to
betray that person.
Which of the following statements best characterizes
your position on deception? (Select one)
1. It is never morally permissible to deceive someone.
2. If deceiving someone will produce greater good than
bad consequences, then it is morally permissible to
deceive that person.
3. If deceiving someone will produce greater good than
bad consequences, then it is morally obligatory to
deceive that person.
Which of the following statements best characterizes
your position on malicious gossip? (Select one)
1. It is never morally permissible to gossip about a per-
son.
2. If gossip will produce greater good than bad con-
sequences, then it is morally permissible to gossip
about a person.
3. If gossip will produce greater good than bad conse-
quences, then it is morally obligatory to gossip about
a person.
Which of the following statements best characterizes
your position on breaking promises? (Select one)
1. It is never morally permissible to break a promise.
2. If breaking a promise will produce greater good than
bad consequences, then it is morally permissible to
break a promise.
3. If breaking a promise will produce greater good than
bad consequences, then it is morally obligatory to
break a promise.
Which of the following statements best characterizes
your position on breaking the law? (Select one)
1. It is never morally permissible to break the law.
2. If breaking the law will produce greater good than
bad consequences, then it is morally permissible to
break the law.
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3. If breaking the law will produce greater good than
bad consequences, then it is morally obligatory to
break the law.
Which of the following statements best characterizes
your position on treason? (Select one)
1. It is never morally permissible to betray your coun-
try or defy governing authorities.
2. If betraying your country or defying governing au-
thorities will produce greater good than bad con-
sequences, then it is morally permissible to betray
your country or defy governing authorities.
3. If betraying your country or defying governing au-
thorities will produce greater good than bad conse-
quences, then it is morally obligatory to betray your
country or defy governing authorities.
Attitude toward Religion scale
1. Religion is for people who can’t think for themselves.*
2. One important benefit of religion is that it provides
people with comfort during hard times.
3. Religion only serves to increase tensions and hostility
between groups of people.*
4. There is little good that comes from religion.*
5. Religion makes most people better than they would be
otherwise.
6. There are some important lessons to learn from
religion.
7. Religious teachings espouse ideas that are out of date
and have little relevance to modern life.*
8. One positive aspect of religion is that it helps bond
people together.
9. Without religion a lot more people would act selfishly
and care little about others.
10. All things considered, religion has caused more harm
than good for the world.*
11. Modern scientific knowledge makes religion unnec-
essary.*
12. Religion mostly promotes tolerance and compassion.
* Reverse-scored. Assessed in terms of level of agree-
ment (1 = Strongly disagree; 9 = Strongly agree).
Short Christian Orthodoxy scale
1. Jesus Christ was the divine Son of God.
2. The Bible may be an important book of moral
teachings, but it was no more inspired by God than were
many other such books in human history.*
3. The concept of God is an old superstition that is no
longer needed to explain things in the modern era.*
4. Through the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus, God
provided a way for the forgiveness of people’s sins.
5. Despite what many people believe, there is no such
thing as a God who is aware of our actions.*
6. Jesus was crucified, died and was buried but on the
third day He arose from the dead.
* Reverse-scored. Assessed in terms of level of agree-
ment (1 = Strongly disagree; 9 = Strongly agree).
Santa Clara Strength of Religious Faith
Questionnaire
1. My religious faith is extremely important to me.
2. I pray daily.
3. I look to my faith as a source of inspiration.
4. I look to my faith as providing meaning and purpose
in my life.
5. I consider myself active in my faith or church.
6. My faith is an important part of who I am as a person.
7. My relationship with God is extremely important to
me.
8. I enjoy being around others who share my faith.
9. I look to my faith as a source of comfort.
10. My faith impacts many of my decisions.
Assessed in terms of the extent to which each statement
describes the participant (1 = Not true of me at all; 9 =
Extremely true of me).
Actively Open-minded Thinking scale
1. Abandoning a previous belief is a sign of good
character.
2. People should always take into consideration evidence
that goes against their beliefs.
3. Beliefs should always be revised in response to new
information or evidence.
4. Changing your mind is a sign of weakness.*
5. Intuition is the best guide in making decisions.*
6. It is important to persevere in your beliefs even when
evidence is brought to bear against them.*
7. One should disregard evidence that conflicts with
one’s established beliefs.*
* Reverse-scored. Assessed in terms of level of agree-
ment (1 = Strongly disagree; 9 = Strongly agree).




3. More severe jail terms





8. Stricter immigration laws
9. Criminalizing pornography for all ages
10. Outlawing abortion even in cases of rape or incest
11. Legalizing marijuana*
12. Making birth control information available to young
people without parent’s permission*
13. Outlawing the buying and selling of firearms*
* Reverse-scored. Items assessed dichotomously in terms
“Opposed” or “NOT opposed”.
Appendix B: Moral dilemmas used in
Study 2
White lie: You have a friend that suffers a great deal
from poor self-esteem. She is particularly sensitive about
her weight and her physical appearance. Recently, she
cut her hair really short and you believe that it does not
help her appearance at all. She asks you what you think
of her new hairdo. In this situation, should you tell your
friend the truth, or lie to spare her feelings?
[1] Definitely should tell the truth; [5] I’m completely
divided about what to do; [9] Definitely should lie
Break promise: Aweek ago, you promised your friend
that you would go with her to see a new exhibition of her
favorite artist’s work. On your way to meet her at the
museum, you see a woman lying motionless on the edge
of the road, and you wonder if she is seriously hurt or
dying. At the moment there is no one else around to
help, but if you stop to help the women you may not be
able to keep your promise to your friend. In this situation,
should you keep your promise to your friend and not help
the woman, or break your promise to your friend and help
the woman?
[1] Definitely should keep the promise; [5] I’m com-
pletely divided about what to do; [9] Definitely should
help the woman
Break in/steal: You have a friend who has severe
asthma. One day you and your friend are out hiking,
and your friend starts to have an asthma attack. She
carelessly forgot to pack her inhaler and you are in the
woods with no one around to help. You notice a cabin
several yards away, so you run there in search of assis-
tance. When you get there you realize no one is home,
and the doors are locked. Through the window, you see
an inhaler sitting on a table in the living room. The
only way to help your friend appears to be to break into
the cabin to get the inhaler. In this situation, should you
leave the cabin as it is and hope for the best, or break into
the cabin to get the inhaler and help your friend?
[1] Definitely should NOT break into the cabin; [5]
I’m completely divided about what to do; [9] Definitely
should break into the cabin
Sex club: You are an unemployed single parent and
have been unable to find a job for several months
now. Everywhere you apply you keep getting turned
down and you are desperate for money to support your
children. Someone offers you a job working in a local sex
club. You would not have to actually perform any sex-
ual acts with anyone unless you wanted to, but you would
have to dress in a leather “fetish” costume and lightly flog
consenting male and female customers with a whip. This
idea makes you uncomfortable, but the club’s activities
are legal in your hometown, and the local economy is so
bad right now that you know that this is the only job offer
you are likely to get for some time. You could refuse the
job offer, but your three children will go hungry, or you
could take the job to feed your children. In this situation,
should you refuse the job offer, or take the job to feed
your family?
[1] Definitely should refuse the job offer; [5] I’m com-
pletely divided about what to do; [9] Definitely should
take the job
Disobey teacher: Your professor at college has paired
you with another classmate to work with on an assign-
ment. The pairs were formed randomly, and although
the professor did not record who is working together, she
states emphatically that she does not want anyone swap-
ping partners. However, after class a classmate asks if
you would be willing to switch partners. The classmate
was assigned to work with a good friend of yours, and
your assigned partner is a good friend of the classmate. If
you disobey your professor and switch partners, everyone
will have a much more enjoyable time working on the
project. Plus, everyone will be working with someone
with whom they collaborate well, so everyone’s grades
would probably end up being higher as well. The profes-
sor would never find out that you switched partners, but
you would be directly defying the professor’s orders. In
this situation, should you obey the professor and refuse
to switch partners, or disobey the professor and switch
partners?
[1] Definitely should refuse to switch partners; [5]
I’m completely divided about what to do; [9] Definitely
should switch partners
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Break rules: You are playing a trivia game with some
friends. The same person keeps winning and he has be-
come quite cocky about it. Everyone is annoyed at the
friend who keeps winning and you know that if some-
one else won for a change, everyone would feel a lot bet-
ter. You realize that you could secretly steer the game in
such a way that one of your other friends would win for a
change. However, this would require that you break some
of the rules of the game. In this situation, should you fol-
low the rules of the game, or break the rules to enable
someone else to win for a change?
[1] Definitely should follow the rules; [5] I’m com-
pletely divided about what to do; [9] Definitely should
break the rules
Infidelity: You are at a party thrown by your spouse’s
company. Your spouse’s boss tells you that your spouse
is a very good employee, but the company is downsizing
and some employees will have to be laid off and your
spouse is one of the employees that will be laid off. The
boss then tells you that you are very attractive and offers
to make sure that your spouse does not lose their job in
exchange for a one-night stand. You do not want to cheat
on your spouse, but the boss is reasonably attractive, and
your family really needs the money from your spouse’s
job. Without it you will not be able to pay all your bills
and mortgage. The boss promises that your spouse will
never find out that you cheated. In this situation, should
you refuse the boss’s offer, thus costing your spouse their
job, or sleep with your spouse’s boss to protect their job?
[1] Definitely should NOT sleep with my spouse’s
boss; [5] I’m completely divided about what to do; [9]
Definitely should sleep with my spouse’s boss
Lie: You are the coach of a children’s soccer team. The
morning of the big game, you realize that you forgot to
reserve a field, which is your responsibility. You drive
out to the local sports complex and see that none of the
fields are being used. The security guard says that you
cannot use a field unless you have reserved one ahead of
time. You could tell the guard the truth, in which case the
children will not get to play their game and will be very
disappointed, or you could lie and tell the guard that you
reserved the field a week ago, in which case the children
will get to play their game. In this situation, should you
tell the truth, or lie about having reserved the field?
[1] Definitely should tell the truth; [5] I’m completely
divided about what to do; [9] Definitely should lie
Damage car: Your grandmother is getting old and her
reflexes and eyesight are starting to deteriorate. De-
spite this, she insists on continuing to drive herself around
town instead of taking public transit. You know that it is
only a matter of time before she eventually causes an ac-
cident and injures herself or someone else. You know
enough about engines that you could safely tamper with
her car’s engine to prevent it from starting. Your grand-
mother knows very little about cars and cannot afford a
new car, so this would force her to give up driving, thus
preventing any future accidents. In this situation, should
you tamper with your grandmother’s car engine to pre-
vent it from starting?
[1] Definitely should NOT tamper with the engine; [5]
I’m completely divided about what to do; [9] Definitely
should tamper with the engine
Break contract: You recently moved into your new
apartment. You are the only tenant, and you signed a
lease that expressly forbids anyone other than you from
living in the apartment. Your friend calls you and tells
you that his lease has expired and he is moving to another
state, and that he could really use a place to stay for the
two weeks before his move. You have plenty of space
in your apartment, and your landlord lives in a different
county and very rarely visits the building, so he would
not find out if you allowed your friend to live with you
for that time. You are the only person in town that your
friend knows, and if you do not let him stay with you, he
will have to rent an expensive month-to-month apartment
or end up homeless. In this situation, should you adhere
to your contract, or break your contract and allow your
friend to stay with you?
[1] Definitely should adhere to the contract; [5] I’m
completely divided about what to do; [9] Definitely
should break the contract
Assisted suicide: You notice recently that your aging
father has been acting strange. For the past few months
it seems like he spends all of his time at the casino gam-
bling and is easily provoked to fits of rage. Your mother
recently passed away, so at first you thought he was sim-
ply acting out in grievance of the loss of his partner. But
just to be safe, you convince him to see a neurologist. The
neurologist discovers an advanced-stage tumor in your fa-
ther’s brain, which explains his uncharacteristic behavior.
The neurologist informs you that the tumor has expanded
to such a degree that it is no longer treatable. Your fa-
ther is expected to live only a few more months, with his
condition getting increasingly worse. A few days after
receiving this bleak diagnosis your father confides in you
that he would rather end his suffering and die peacefully
now then live out the next few months in misery. He asks
you to help him end his life. In this situation, should you
help end your father’s life?
[1] Definitely should NOT help him end his life; [5]
I’m completely divided about what to do; [9] Definitely
should help him end his life
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Appendix C: Scales used in Study 2
not provided in text
Functions of Rules Measure
Guidance function (naturally sinful)
1. The rules exist because people’s depraved nature
prevents them frommaking good moral decisions on
their own.
2. The rules exist because people will naturally choose
wickedness over goodness.
3. The rules exist to prevent people from acting upon
their natural, sinful impulses.
Guidance function (naturally fallible)
1. The rules exist because people would often make
mistakes or bad decisions without them.
2. The rules exist because people do not always know
what the best course of action is.
3. The rules exist because human judgment is flawed.
Welfare function
1. The rules exist to stop people from hurting one an-
other.
2. The rules exist to help protect people.
3. The rules exist to ensure that everyone lives together
peacefully.
Fairness function
1. The rules exist to prevent one person from having an
unfair advantage over another person.
2. The rules exist to create an equal playing field for
all.
3. The rules exist to ensure that everyone has an equal
opportunity at the pursuit of happiness.
